by Haazim W. Muntaqim (Jeffrey Milo Burks)
After reading “The PeliKKKan Bay factor: An indictable offense” in the Februay 2013 edition of the San Francisco Bay View, I am compelled to share with your readers the evidence I have uncovered while doing research into my own case after I was framed by corrupt guards and convicted of murder at Folsom Prison in 1984. I have uncovered the real intentions behind the implementation of the deadly “integrated yard policy” and its bloody history at Folsom Prison.
The writers of the article did an excellent job exposing the Folsom Prison administration’s role in creating the violent conditions by exploiting racial tensions already prevalent inside the overcrowded prison. By instigating violence between prisoners, administrators and the prison union, California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA), together they would call for more security for guards and more maximum security prisons to control the violence among prisoners.
The evidence I have found clearly shows a direct link between the integrated yard policy and the building of Pelican Bay and Corcoran maximum security prisons and isolation units, or the SHU.
Since first opening in 1880, Folsom Prison was renowned for the violence constantly erupting within its walls, but during the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the violence within the prison was not solely the product of pissed off prisoners or rival groups. In early 1980, Folsom Prison administrators were under investigation behind allegations of administrative corruption, violent attacks by guards on prisoners, guards setting up prisoners for attack by other prisoners and falsifying documents to frame prisoners for crimes they did not commit.
Prison is a microcosm of society. Sick administrators will ultimately lead to a sick society. Thus, it should come as no surprise that Folsom became the most corrupt and violent prison in the history of American prisons.
The evidence I have found clearly shows a direct link between the integrated yard policy and the building of Pelican Bay and Corcoran maximum security prisons and isolation units, or the SHU.
On June 19, 1982, I arrived at Folsom Prison. The same day, violence erupted between rival groups. Initially prison administrators attempted to quell the disturbance with a lockdown. A week later the violence broke out again, forcing the administrators to lock the prison down and begin a process of identifying and then segregating the groups involved.
This tactic appeared to be working, as the number of stabbings fell. In 1981, there were roughly 55 assaults with weapons and two deaths at the prison. From June 19, 1982, to the end of 1982, there were 48 stabbings and two deaths. The separation of the known enemies kept the violence down, but the violent attacks were high nevertheless.
On Dec. 28, 1982, Folsom Prison spokesman Gil Miller said, after the fourth stabbing death of the year, “There have been more stabbings at Folsom this year than at any time in the prison’s history.” He blamed the total of 70 stabbing incidents, including the four deaths, on the overcrowding of 3,000 violent prone inmates in a facility designed for 2,000.
The integrated yard edict
Through the first 11 months of 1983, numerous attacks took place inside the prison. Prison officials were reporting internal strife in the Texas Syndicate, a prison gang, resulted in the stabbing of a prisoner. On March 3, 1983, an alleged member of the so-called Israeli Mafia was reported to have been stabbed by an alleged member of the Mexican Mafia. These types of assaults were taking place and the prison administration dealt with them as isolated incidents.
In August 1983, Folsom Prison was ordered by a federal court judge to stop double celling prisoners in the Security Housing Units (SHU) and Emergency Housing Unit (EHU). Up to this point in the year, there was little mention of racial tension or racial violence taking place inside the prison. The segregated rival groups could not attack each other.
Historically, prison administrators have scoffed at and flat out refused to carry out court orders won by prisoners relating to prison conditions. The administrators believed they were better suited to know what is best for their prisoners.
Refusing to give the prisoners a victory over them, Folsom administrators decided they would enforce the court’s ruling to single cell prisoners in the SHU and EHU, employing an insidious plot which required manipulating and exploiting racial enmity between African American and Mexican American prisoners. The results would have deadly consequences for prisoners while at the same time help to subvert the court’s ruling by activating an emergency clause halting the court order.
According to official reports, on Nov. 18, 1983, three more racially motivated stabbings occurred in Folsom Prison as authorities ended a controversial policy blamed by prison officials for a two-day outbreak of violence. After seven stabbings in two days, prison authorities announced they had stopped the court-ordered policy of releasing dangerous convicts back into the prison mainstream.
While the authorities blamed the two days of violence on a court ordered policy which required them to release “dangerous convicts back into the prison mainstream,” the court order did not mandate the release of prisoners into the mainstream or general population.
Insidious plots require some degree of deception. So I will make this point clear. The seven stabbings in two days took place inside the Emergency Housing Unit (EHU) established by the prison administrators for the purpose of SEGREGATING RIVAL GROUPS after the brutal stabbing death of Richard Benjamin on Sept. 14, 1983. Two of the five tiers inside of the EHU were segregated by race and gang affiliations. The court order to end double celling in the security housing units did not mandate the integration of the tiers in the EHU.
Historically, prison administrators have scoffed at and flat out refused to carry out court orders won by prisoners relating to prison conditions.
On May 31, 1984, Folsom Prison officials told a federal judge they deliberately mixed a few Mexican-American inmates with a large number of Blacks last November because of their commitment to racial integration. The plan was risky, former warden Paul Morris and former housing officer Glen Mueller told U.S. District Judge Stanley Weigel.
“It’s a little curious that all of a sudden we got religion on the subject of integration,” Weigel remarked. In his response to contempt of court charges, Lt. Glen Mueller, who supervised the EHU, testified: “Cell assignments the week of Nov. 14 were based on availability of space and a policy of racial integration. I had to place people wherever I had room,” he said.
He said he did not look at the prisoner’s central files, which identified gang affiliations, because it had never been his practice to do so. Remember their plot was to mix races; they only needed to see the prisoners’ skin color. “In most cases violence doesn’t result from mixing gangs,” he said. “We’ve done it before and gotten away with it,” Morris replied.
The alleged integration policy did not exist at Old Folsom Prison. All the Security Housing Units and the Emergency Housing Unit were segregated by race and gang affiliations. Prisoners were housed on racially segregated tiers and exercise yards.
Prior to Nov. 14, 1983, prison officials had attempted to integrate the EHU with deadly results. On Sept. 14, 1983, Richard Benjamin, who was African American, was stabbed to death by four Mexican-American prisoners. He’d recently moved to the EHU and was killed on his way to the exercise yard.
Spokesman Gil Miller said the attack on Benjamin was race-related. It was definitely a racial problem; it was definitely a racial hit. Benjamin and Gonzales, one of the assailants, had been transferred out of two-man cells the previous month as a result of a federal court order prohibiting double celling.
The next day, on Sept. 15, 1983, more racial violence occurred when a Black inmate allegedly stabbed two Hispanic inmates. Gil Miller said, “Racial hatred is the underlying motive,” noting an on-going conflict between Black and Hispanic inmates.
On Oct. 28, 1983, the 50th stabbing of the year barred a tour of the prison by a group of state lawmakers, preventing the committee members from seeing the inside of the maximum security prison. On Nov. 9, 1983, again an inmate was stabbed. “A member of a prison inmate gang was in stable condition Wednesday after being stabbed by a member of a rival gang,” Folsom Prison officials said. These reports are coming from Folsom Prison officials who knew beyond a shadow of a doubt that these rival groups would attack each other on sight.
The alleged integration policy did not exist at Old Folsom Prison. All the Security Housing Units and the Emergency Housing Unit were segregated by race and gang affiliations. Prisoners were housed on racially segregated tiers and exercise yards.
These orchestrated attacks were a prelude to the Nov. 14, 1983, set up. There were no public outcries nor questions raised behind Benjamin’s murder and the four stabbings following his death. Remember former Warden Paul Morris had said, “We’ve done if before and gotten away with it.” He is clearly referring to the sad fact that the murder of Benjamin and four stabbings of prisoners caused little concern on the outside.
Their intentions were to put a stop to the court order to single cell prisoners. They had to up the ante. One or two deaths or stabbings weren’t enough to generate concerns about their actions, so they moved five Hispanics to an all-African tier and five Africans to an all-Hispanic tier. The results were violently predictable.
“Federal Judge Weigel said his injunction requiring an end to double-celling in the maximum security unit could be superseded if Warden Paul Morris believes inmates could become assailants or victims.” The judge modified his injunction late Thursday after four Hispanic convicts were hospitalized by a gang-related knife attack which prison guards and administrators blamed on his initial injunction.
“Under an emergency clause, we had immediately stopped releasing the most dangerous inmates into the general population,” said prison spokesman Lt. Ted Zink. “The judge’s latest ruling makes it a new ballgame.” They were playing games with prisoners’ lives and, like pawns in a chess game, prisoners were the only casualties.
Their intentions were to put a stop to the court order to single cell prisoners. They had to up the ante. One or two deaths or stabbings weren’t enough to generate concerns about their actions, so they moved five Hispanics to an all-African tier and five Africans to an all-Hispanic tier. The results were violently predictable.
Here is former Folsom Housing Unit Officer Denise Stanfield testifying at the Senate Rules Committee hearings for Joseph Campoy to become warden, March 6, 1985:
Chairman Roberti: Can you speak to your knowledge of the incidents that led up to the integration of the prison cells when the stabbings occurred, I believe, in late 1983, after the court had indicated that double-celling had to cease?
Ms. Stanfield: Well, I was tier officer at the time. There was a certain routine we followed on a daily basis. And then one day we were told that routine would change. When I came into work the next day at 11:00 o’clock, I noticed the yard was open, and the inmates on the tier that I worked, the Black tier and the Mexican tier, were out on the yard with the general population. And they were grouped racially and separated. None of the normal activities on the yard were going on.
Upon returning from the yard, we noticed the composition of the tiers, which concerned myself and a fellow officer. I brought this to the attention of my supervisor, and he basically ignored me, told me he didn’t know what I was talking about.
Chairman Roberti: Was there any feeling among the guards or, to your knowledge, among the prisoners that there was going to be trouble?
Ms. Stanfield: Yes, I overheard bets being made on who was going to get stuck first.
Chairman Roberti: Bets?
Ms. Stanfield: Bets.
From top to bottom, administrators and guards knew what was about to take place as they made bets on who was going to get stuck first! Even the guards proved Lt. Glen Mueller’s words untrue: “In most cases violence doesn’t result from mixing gangs,” he said. There would have been no need for integration of the tiers if they were not already segregated!
By their own admissions, as deceitful as they were, Folsom Prison administrators intentionally integrated the EHU tiers, which led to an immediate eruption of racial violence before Nov. 14, 1983, and well after those documented incidents. Still no indictments and the atrocities grew ever more cunning and deadly…
Integrated yard policy ignites racial strife
One spark can ignite a prairie fire. The integrated yard policy became a blazing incendiary, leaping the granite walls of Folsom Prison to ignite racial strife inside San Quentin and other prisons around the state.
Inside Folsom Prison, 1984 ended with 109 stabbings and six deaths. The integration policy was the perfect storm for the prison administrators, the CCPOA (the guards’ union), California politicians and greedy corporate business men looking to cash in on the ever growing and expanding Prison Industrial Complex now sprouting new prisons like oil wells in rural counties across the American landscape.
High tech prisons became the new Black Gold. “Get tough on crime” legislation and prison expansion lobbyists worked hand in hand in the mid-1980s. Politicians were holding hearings in Sacramento and meeting inside Folsom Prison to try and determine how to create more space or build more prisons to ease the overcrowding in California’s prison system.
Business men and woman were licking their chops as the government signaled a willingness to open its pocket book to build more prisons. No doubt the constant media coverage detailing the unprecedented violence at Folsom and San Quentin prisons and the CCPOA lobbyists played a large role in prison expansion and designing of high tech prisons like Pelican Bay and Corcoran.
Don Novey, then president of the CCPOA, once a brilliant counterintelligence agent working overseas for the United States government, had little difficulty countering allegations or suggestions that prison officials were fully or partly responsible for the murders and mayhem taking place. Novey’s union had a big stake in the games being played with prisoners’ lives.
The integration policy was the perfect storm for the prison administrators, the CCPOA (the guards’ union), California politicians and greedy corporate business men looking to cash in on the ever growing and expanding Prison Industrial Complex now sprouting new prisons like oil wells in rural counties across the American landscape.
The greater the violence grew, the louder the CCPOA screamed for more new high tech prisons and more guards to control the prisons and protect society from the violent prisoners.
The Brothers writing the article “The Pelikkkan Bay factor: An indictable offense” were probably not aware that “Old Folsom” Prison administrators had previously tried and tested the integration policy and found it to be an effective tool against prisoners. Before employing the tactic in 1987, they knew the results would be deadly and effective in pushing whatever line they were trying to enforce.
Midway through 1984, the violence was rampant. Senators, local politicians, the media and prisoners’ families were raising serious questions about the violence inside Folsom Prison, while arrogant, untouchable prison officials continued integrating enemies. The answer to the “WHY” question has solidly smacked the questioners in the face, but those in positions of power turned a blind eye to the truth, refusing to hold the guilty accountable.
Prisoners did not integrate themselves onto tiers filled with their mortal enemies.
The greater the violence grew, the louder the CCPOA screamed for more new high tech prisons and more guards to control the prisons and protect society from the violent prisoners.
In a May 1984 hearing on Folsom violence, federal officials were acting on a letter received April 3, 1984, and made public by Judge Stanley Weigel. The letter reported results of a federal investigation of Folsom begun in August 1980, after the Justice Department received complaints from prisoners and lawyers. The probe included interviews with complainants and prison officials, a four-day tour of the prison in1983 and a review of documents.
The investigation concluded that the Folsom population of over 3,200 greatly exceeded design capacity. “Folsom annually is the site of serious incidents of violence between inmates. Stabbings, fights and assaults occur frequently. Inmates are frequently found with weapons. Inmates have been seriously injured as a result of these incidents. There have been a number of fatalities in each of the past several years. Consequently, it is our view that Folsom Prison inmates are not being provided with adequate protection from harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Our investigation indicates that these conditions have existed at least since 1979.” An indictable offense.
Accountability, responsibility and negligence: Folsom officials were immune to these rules of moral conduct. Recently, a bus driver fell asleep at the wheel killing 13 of his 28 passengers and was charged with criminal negligence, 13 counts of involuntary manslaughter.
The integration policy began in September 1983. Twenty stabbings and two deaths could be directly attributed to the integration policy by the end of December 1983.
The entire year of 1984, there were 109 stabbings and six deaths inside the prison. In 16 months, there are eight deaths and 139 stabbings.
During the first six months of 1985, there were 114 stabbings and three deaths, bringing the total over 22 months to 253 stabbings and 11 deaths. The vast majority of these recorded incidents resulted from the integration policy.
On Jan. 25, 1985, racial violence spread in Folsom Prison. The racial strife between Blacks and Hispanics that caused one of the most violent-plagued years in the history of Folsom State Prison during 1984 was spilling over onto other inmates, prison officials reported. Assaults were more difficult to explain and involved inmates not associated with any gang.
“It used to be attacks were always a Black and Brown thing. Now it has escalated to involving everyone. It’s more than anything I’ve ever seen,” said Lt. Bobby Jackson. Sgt. Jack R. Corrie said he has also noticed violence in all areas of the jail.
At least one group of unidentified inmates was charging that the jail officials had been the catalyst for some of the inmate trouble. A five-page letter sent to a federal judge, Assembly Speaker Willie Brown Jr., D-San Francisco, and local media listed many of the reasons for anger among inmates, including the lengthy series of complete and partial lockdowns at the prison since October, when the violence escalated further.
The letter said the lockdowns are part of a “subtle but provocative campaign to initiate violence and that prison officials indiscriminately move enemy inmates within close proximity of each other in cells, the mess halls and yard.” Assistant Director of CDC Robert J. Gore said, “Such allegations are ludicrous.”
The integration policy had created a full blown racial war. All African-Americans and Mexican-Americans were attacking each other on sight.
The CDC and CCPOA were cohorts in increasing the racial violence with the integration policy, blaming the prisoners and then making demands for more maximum security prisons and more guards, which led to more power for both entities.
On May 30, 1985, the Sacramento Bee published “‘85 Bloodiest Year for Folsom Inmates” by staff writer Richard J. Brenneman, who began by writing: “It was described as the bloodiest day of the bloodiest year in recent memory when eight inmates were stabbed Monday inside Folsom Prison. … Those injuries jumped the stabbings of prisoners by prisoners in Folsom to 114 for the year – five more than the total for all of 1984.”
“‘I was watch sergeant Monday, and those ambulances were rolling in and out,’ said Don Novey. ‘While we were trying to feed the inmates, they were going at each others’ throats. They were tearing their bunks apart to stab each other.’
“As president of the California Correctional Peace Officers Association and a guard at Folsom, Novey is deeply worried about the rising bloodshed,” the Bee reports.
Apparently he was not worried enough to demand the integration policy be stopped. That was the root cause of the escalating violence.
The CDC and CCPOA were cohorts in increasing the racial violence with the integration policy, blaming the prisoners and then making demands for more maximum security prisons and more guards, which led to more power for both entities.
Novey’s main concern was prison expansion. The CCPOA and CDC, relying on the violence at Folsom and San Quentin prisons, had successfully lobbied to have four new maximum security prisons built.
Novey said some of the current troubles should come to an end when the state opened its first new maximum security prison in more than a century at Tehachapi sometime late the following year, 1986. New Folsom Prison, Corcoran State Prison and Pelican Bay Prison would follow. The lives and blood of prisoners became the foundations upon which these four prisons were built.
From September 1983 to May 30, 1985, the 253 stabbings and 11 deaths in a 22 month period made it easy to pitch the urgent need for high tech security prisons, more lethal weapons and greater control to politicians and the general public. They were duped by the CDC and CCPOA.
Novey’s main concern was prison expansion. The CCPOA and CDC, relying on the violence at Folsom and San Quentin prisons, had successfully lobbied to have four new maximum security prisons built.
On May 31, 1985, the California Legislature’s Joint Committee on Prison Construction and Operations scheduled a hearing for June 19 on the violence rate and stabbings at Folsom Prison. The press release began: “In the wake of accelerating levels of violence and stabbings at Folsom Prison, we have scheduled a special hearing … to look into the violence, its causes, and what options exist to try to reduce it.
“Folsom must be one of the most violent, if not THE most violent in the nation by the number of stabbings. They will apparently have 230-250 stabbings this year, based on 115 at the halfway mark. This is unacceptable.
“The rate is already twice that of last year, and 115 stabbings by the end of May compares to 94 in all of 1984.”
The lives and blood of prisoners became the foundations upon which these four prisons were built.
In July 1985, prisoners were urged by prison officials to make peace and end the senseless war. Deals were made, officials promised immediate release from the SHU when peace was made. And prisoners were granted the infamous “In House Cleaning Policy” to help them enforce the truce on the younger prisoners who did not want the war to end. This explains why, when the racial war ended, the violence increased.
1985 closed with 200 stabbings and seven deaths. Remember, the prisoners ended the race war in July 1985. The new wave of violence was another policy implemented by Folsom Prison officials designed to control the violence carried out by prisoners. The “In House Cleaning Policy” is discussed in my book “The Unbelievable Truth.”
At the end of 1986, New Folsom Prison opened across the street from Old Folsom Prison. The new high tech prison became the Security Housing Unit for the alleged gang members who were given indeterminate SHU terms based upon their gang affiliations.
The high tech prisons were designed to provide guards with complete security coverage and control over prisoners. Newly hired guards, younger and just as aggressive as the young prisoners filling up cells, became a focal point of contention, and it’s within this environment of oppression and mental and physical abuse where the prison officials claimed they were going to destroy prison gang structures by implementing the “INTEGRATED YARD POLICY.”
It’s been demonstrated above that prison administrators held little if any regard for the lives of prisoners. The success or failure of prison policies was often measured by the physical harm or deaths prisoners experienced! No doubt the prison administrators who employed the integrated yard policy were patted on their backs for a job well done and promoted into higher levels of responsibility within the CDC.
Ten years after New Folsom’s integrated yard policy was deployed, 30 prisoners had been shot to death and hundreds maimed and disfigured for life, the truth was exposed.
On Oct. 28, 1996, a headline on the front page of the San Francisco Chronicle read, “Accusations of Prison Coverup: Agency hid staged fights at Corcoran, guards say.” Writer R. Holding reported:
“From the moment the Central Valley facility opened, Corcoran has been one of the most violent institutions in the nation. Inmates have accused guards of exploiting gang and racial tensions to make prisoners fight – and then shooting combatants who refused to stop. At the same time, the department’s budget requests have repeatedly relied upon increasing inmates’ violence to help justify more money from Sacramento.
“Just two months before the department tried to block the federal investigation of Corcoran; for example, Department of Corrections Director James Gomez wrote the Legislature that inmate violence ‘has risen dramatically’ and that the shortage of prisons will ‘increase the potential for violence and injury to inmates and staff.’
“Department officials ‘don’t want the violence to stop,’ said Steve Riggs, a lieutenant at Corcoran from 1988 to 1995. ‘They want to (use the violence to) convince the public that we need more money, more prisons and more security.’”
Sounds exactly like what was taking place at Folsom Prison in the 1980s. The Corcoran investigation concluded, “The saga of Corcoran began with an obscure prison edict issued during the 1980s: The integrated yard policy.”
Across the country, hundreds or thousands of men and woman have been sentenced to death or life in prison with far less evidence against them and no admissions of culpability.
“Department officials ‘don’t want the violence to stop,’ said Steve Riggs, a lieutenant at Corcoran from 1988 to 1995. ‘They want to (use the violence to) convince the public that we need more money, more prisons and more security.’”
In the last 30 years, employees of the CDC have climbed the ladder to success leaving beneath them the bloody rungs soaked with the life force of innocent prisoners. Some died and many survived not knowing how or why they were set up for murder or brutalized by a deadly policy. For family members left behind and those survivors, the above is the INDICTABLE TRUTH, taken from pages of “The Unbelievable Truth.”
Sources:
- Joint Committee on Prison Construction and Operations
- The Sacramento Bee, “‘85 Bloodiest Year for Folsom Inmates” by staff writer Richard J. Brenneman
- The Associated Press
- Folsom Prison official documents
- Corcoran State Prison Hearings: Closing Statement by Sen. John Vasconcellos, Oct. 22, 1998
- My personal experience at Folsom State Prison from 1982 to 1991
Send our brother some love and light: Jeffrey Milo Burks (Haazim W. Muntaqim), B-64401, Calipatria D1-224, P.O. Box 5007, Calipatria CA 92233. Haazim pledges “solidarity with the resistance and hunger strikers around the world.” He also writes, “I give authorization for the use of any part of this commentary by the San Francisco Bay View and the men who wrote the original article if they desire to pursue the issue further.” “The PeliKKKan Bay factor: An indictable offense” was written by Abdul Olugbala Shakur, Mutope Duguma, Sitawa Nantambu Jamaa and Abasi Ganda.